Fire safety failings dominated the findings of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s Phase 2 report. Here, HQN’s Grenfell reporter Danielle Aumord focuses on a number of key aspects that contributed to the disaster.

The Phase 2 report from the Grenfell Tower inquiry into the 2017 fire cites numerous reasons for the tragedy that claimed 72 lives, but it specifically highlights the failure of the tenant management organisation (TMO) to take fire safety seriously during the refurbishment project.

According to the report, the TMO regarded fire safety as “an inconvenience rather than an essential aspect of its duty to manage its property carefully” and those involved in the design and execution of the refurbishment of the West London tower block “failed to understand” the need for a fire safety strategy.

A fire safety strategy is a document that contains all of the information needed for informed decision-making and emergency responses in the event of a fire in a residential building. It should, in theory, describe its structure, the various fire production systems it contains and set out how they work together to ensure the safety of the occupants in the event of a fire.

However, it transpired during the inquiry that the relevant Grenfell document, started by fire engineering company Exova, only existed in draft form and was never finalised. This allowed the refurbishment of the block of flats to be left in a dangerous state on completion.

“Companies need to be held to higher safety standards to avoid tragedies such as the Grenfell Tower fire,” Laurie Pollard, Managing Director at fire safety products firm Firechief Global, told HQN.  “The government and regulatory bodies need to continue to evolve fire safety laws at pace to close oversights and implement stricter enforcement on companies selling life safety products in an unscrupulous way.”

In light of the failings at Grenfell, the inquiry recommended that a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer must now be submitted within building control applications for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building. It also recommended that the document should be reviewed again at the completion stage of the work.

The efficacy of the new BS 9414 fire safety test, which replaced the BS 8414 test used to check the cladding on the Grenfell refurbishment, and is currently being used by construction firms, was also questioned by the inquiry.

The latest version of the test has been published with the approval of government since the Grenfell fire but Professor Jose Torero, who gave evidence at the inquiry, warned that the test is “a very simple exercise to find weaknesses and flaws”.

“The principles behind BS 9414 are fundamentally flawed and this document will continue to encourage an inappropriate process of fire performance assessment. Thus, it is my strong belief that this standard should not be used,” he wrote.

In light of Professor Torero’s evidence, the inquiry is recommending that the government should make it clear that this test should not be used as a substitute for an assessment by a suitably qualified fire engineer.

“Regular fire risk assessments should become a routine part of building management, and residents need clear guidance on how to act in a fire situation,” added Pollard.

“Additionally, better fire safety training for all stakeholders, extending to builders, safety product manufacturers, residents, and fire service professionals, would help to ensure a coordinated response when the worst happens. Residents should also be made aware of evacuation routes in the event of a fire.”

The Building Safety Act 2022 also came under scrutiny during the inquiry. By definition within the act, a higher-risk building is one that is at least 18-metres in height or has a minimum of seven storeys and contains at least two residential units.

The act was passed by parliament after the tragedy at Grenfell, with the purpose of regulating work on these buildings by imposing specific duties on those involved in the refurbishment and construction.

But representatives for the inquiry have now recommended that the definition of a higher-risk building within the act to be urgently reviewed.

A spokesperson said: “We do not think that to define a building as ‘higher risk’ by reference only to its height is satisfactory, being essentially arbitrary in nature.”

Emma O’Connor, who escaped the Grenfell Tower fire by using the lift from the 20th floor, agreed: “I would like the 18-metre rule to be abolished and for the definition of a higher-risk building to incorporate any building with flammable cladding on it. That could include hospitals, hotels and football stadiums, not just blocks of flats.

“Another Grenfell can and will happen. Dodgy construction firms have still been able to make money by continuing to sell dangerous cladding,” she added. “It’s not fair that other people’s lives could be destroyed like ours were. Many of these firms knew that the cladding they were selling posed a significant fire risk even before the Grenfell Tower fire. We even heard at the inquiry that they falsified fire safety tests.”